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As the entire world is struggling with the Covid-19 pandemic, academics have been
rediscovering the debate on emergency in public law. 
Our post explores whether the theory of disaster risk regulation can infuse the public
law’s approach to emergency with new conceptual tools that contribute to mitigating
the impact of emergencies. In so doing, we would like to recall how comparative
public law has approached emergency and we shall then look at the insights coming
from the theory of risk.
Emergency in Comparative Public Law
Emergencies push legal orders to their pillars of Hercules. The rule of law struggles
to regulate unpredictable scenarios. As a result, the notion of emergency belongs
to the worst ones. For many constitutional comparative lawyers emergencies are a
potential engine of constitutional change or even a cause of legal revolutions, due
to the risk of political abuses subsequent to the centralisation of powers traditionally
occurring in favour of governments. That is why the Venice Commission stated
that “De facto state of emergency should be avoided, and emergency rule should
be officially declared”. Hence, the search for effective legal instruments that aim to
uphold the rule of law against extraordinary circumstances is an essential task for
any legal order. But can constitutions regulate emergencies? Is this desirable? Are
emergency powers in ordine powers or, rather, extra ordinem powers that cannot be
governed and tamed by constitutional provisions?
Post-WWII constitutionalism and its constitutional openness added a further level of
complexity. Regardless of what national constitutions exactly say about emergency
or emergency powers, the existence of macro-regional human rights charters such
as the European Convention on Human Rights or the American Convention on
Human Rights can contribute to limiting the subversive impact of emergencies
through the protection of fundamental rights and the equilibrium of power. These
international instruments protect precious interests deemed as essential both at
national and international level. This is the case with Article 15.2 of the ECHR,
which reflects the need to guarantee some fundamental rights even in times of
emergency. It acknowledges also the fact that international organisations contribute
to rationalizing political powers and fostering  checks and balances.
This debate reminds us of the discussion about the codification of secession
clauses. One of the reasons to avoid this option is the fact that this kind of clause
would be a trap, favouring the instability of the system. This is why constitutions
frequently rely on ambiguity. However, research suggests that ambiguity is
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sometimes not a smart strategy as it could end up in affecting the sustainability of
a constitutional order. Another strategy is silence. Abeyances, as Foley explained
some years ago, “are important, therefore, because of their capacity to deter the
formation of conflicting positions in just those areas where the potential for conflict is
most acute”.
Comparative law confirms this variety of views. Among the legal systems equipped
with explicit emergency clauses, there are examples which provide for a “gradual
approach” depending on the type of emergency at stake. Spain is a very telling
example. Article 116 of the Spanish Constitution identifies three kinds of emergency,
which differ in the role of Parliament and in terms of impact on fundamental rights:
state of alarm, state of exception (called state of emergency in the official translation,
but the Spanish version refers to the “Estado de excepción”) and state of siege. 
On the other side of the spectrum there are quasi-silent constitutions, like the Italian
one, which never employs the term “emergency” and does not provide for special
schemes applicable to exceptional situations other than war (Art. 78). This does not
exclude the existence of instruments applicable to cases of necessity and urgency
which covers for instance the so-called decree-laws (“decreti legge”). The Italian
case, as illustrated by some colleagues in this blog, is an interesting example, as
it had to adapt to the contingent circumstances of the pandemics. In the center of
interest so far hav been administrative measures, the so-called “decrees of the
President of the Council of Ministers” (DPCM), depriving Parliament of its important
function of scrutiny.
In any casethe administrative branches of legal orders remain key actors in
emergencies, as they provide immediate responses even in the absence of specific
constitutional emergency powers. Generally speaking, emergency powers are
exercised through atypical administrative acts, whose effects are not legally
prescribed because of the objective to deal with exceptional facts that ordinary
law cannot predict. Giannini effectively defined these powers as a safety “valve”
protecting legal orders against the rigidity of legislation in legally unknown situations.
In a democratic system, this means that derogation from law is admitted within
the limits of general principles and their constitutional foundations. In other words,
competent institutions can adopt any measures to tackle the imminent danger but
the principle of proportionality shall guide the public intervention.
The temporary nature of emergency powers is thus implicit in their characterisation.
Their use is legitimate insofar as the (legally) extraordinary situation lasts; but how
can the end of the emergency be recognised? Facts (and not law) can indicate
it. The lack of legal scrutiny on the end of the emergency brings the risk that the
administrative use of emergency powers deviates from their original goals. Only
check-and-balances of the wider legal system can prevent such a vitiated drift.
During the current pandemic the progressive relaxation of the restrictive measures
aimed to contain the spread of the disease can still be placed in the context of the
emergency intervention. This means effectively a progressive shift of approach
towards risk regulation according to the reduction of the number of infected people.
A research led by Alberto Alemanno effectively qualified “the regulatory action
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undertaken in the immediacy of a disaster in order to mitigate its impact” as
“emergency risk regulation”. These are critical moments for legal orders, from both
a factual and legal point of view: the transition from an extraordinary situation to the
normalisation of the contagion requires law to make a paradigm shift, for which it
needs to be well-equipped to be successful.
Risk Regulation in Comparative Public Law
The attempts to introduce the concept of risk as a regulatory notion have started at
the administrative level but scholars have been recently thinking of its application in
a constitutional context, too, especially in the United States. For instance, Vermeule
described constitutions as risk management devices, distinguishing two competing
paradigms of constitutionalism: precautionary constitutionalism and optimising
constitutionalism. While the former implies that “constitutional rulemakers and
citizens design and manage political institutions with a view to warding off the
worst case”, the latter instead “trades off all relevant political risks, giving them
their due weight in the circumstances, without any systematic skew or bias against
any particular type of political risk”. This approach was actually part of a broader
reflection in the US on the limits of the precautionary principle. However, Vermeule
has been criticised for his rigid differentiation of risks between administrative (first-
order risks involving “substantive governmental policies”) and constitutional law
(second-order risks involving the “design of institutions”) that does not necessarily
correspond to our idea of public law in Europe. However, the concept of risk
regulation could add value in comparative public law.
Risk regulation allows the monitoring and the management of risks that might have
severe consequences for a community. The idea is that through the continuous
assessment of such significant risks and the adoption of proportionate control
measures, emergency scenarios can be limited and to some extent predicted.
The introduction of the risk paradigm in comparative public law can sensitively
reduce the distortions in the use of emergency powers. In addition, risk regulation
gives voice to those rights competing with safety and security. Most frequently
this are economic rights. In the current crisis, the introduction of measures of risk
regulation would allow the protection of economic interests and, to some extent,
would reduce the adverse economic externalities of the continued lockdown.
Yet, risk regulation requires the identification of an adequate safety level based
on scientific assessment and the proportionate evaluation of the trade-off among
competing rights. When disastrous risks are at stake, like in a pandemic, the high
level of uncertainty regarding the probability of the risk challenges the application
of the principles of risk regulation. Yet, the elevated consequences in terms of
casualties and losses require some regulation. The search for protection should
engage in the difficult task of assessing both probabilities and anticipating the
severity of the possible impact. In a case-by-case analysis, risk regulation should
therefore consider the severity of the threat; the degree of reversibility of its effects;
the possibility of delayed consequences; and the perception of the threat based on
available scientific data.
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Unlike emergency powers, risk regulation does not reflect the application of the
principle of reasonableness in the fight or prevention of an immediate danger. Where
the threat is not an emergency yet, law cannot be derogated, but precautionary
action may be appropriate. In the domain of risk regulation, the application of the
precautionary principle shall be justified by science as well as by the values that
structure the legal order. To be sustainable, the precautionary approach requires
scientific research and testing; that is, accurate risk assessment. If not, this approach
based on the worst-case scenario generates exceptional costs.
This necessarily creates a burden of proof on the risk-taker. According to Sunstein,
strong applications of the precautionary principle can paralyse innovation. A weak
approach, however, shows that science shall feed risk management and decision-
making under uncertainty. Has this been done in the current pandemic? Probably not
yet and not everywhere.
Only where decision-makers engage in a thorough risk assessment, restrictive
measures can legitimately protect the relevant values and interests. The careful and
accurate balance of scientific evidence, values and the possible effects of measures
shall structure the proportionality test in the definition of the appropriate level of
protection. Is comparative public law ready to engage in this task and to innovate its
own tools to mitigate crises? This is the big challenge for the pandemic’s aftermath.
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